The Utility of the Tor Network


By: Hammas Bin Tanveer

Advisor: Dr. Rishab Nithyanand





The Anonymous Internet





















































Get: Tor client




















An internet connection through Tor Service Descriptors




- Contact Information
- Public Keys
- Average Bandwidth
- Exit Policy

```
A basic Exit policy Example for Web Browsing (only) -

ExitPolicy accept *:53  # DNS
ExitPolicy accept *:80  # HTTP
ExitPolicy accept *:443  # HTTPS
ExitPolicy reject *:*
```










Publish




The Tor circuit




























































Daniyal

Mahnaz



























































Tor vs. A regular internet connection

Tor vs. A regular internet connection




Tor vs. A regular internet connection



- Use a regular browser configured to route traffic
- Use the Tor browser which comes preconfigured with the Tor proxy

Tor vs. A regular internet connection




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


- Setting up a Tor circuit
- Network traffic is routed through a minimum of three Onion routers which are volunteered owned and operated

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


Tor vs. A regular internet connection



An Onion Proxy needs to be set up to route traffic through Tor:

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


The end server (Mahnaz) sees the traffic coming from the Exit Relay instead of the sender (Daniyal)


• The number of people who can successfully access the Tor network as compared to the number of people trying to access the Tor network

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
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Use a regular browser configured to route traffic through Tor

- Directions are not straightforward for a typical internet user
- Installation required knowledge of complicated jargon
- Validating whether Tor proxy is working is not straightforward

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Use a regular browser configured to route traffic through Tor


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Using the Tor browser

Challenge	Category label
Broken Functionality	Broken websites
	Reduced productivity
	Shopping
Geolocation	Geolocation
Latency	Slower Access
Differential Treatment	CAPTCHAs/Pages inaccessible



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Censorship of Tor

- Access blocked to the Tor Project's website
- Access blocked to publicly listed relays in the consensus document
- Analysis of Tor traffic, blocking Tor connections




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Using the Tor browser configured to route traffic through Tor Challenge Category label Broken websites Reduced productivity Shopping Validating whether Tor proxy is working is not straightforward Geolocation Latency Differential Treatment CAPTCHAs/Pages inaccessible

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CENSORSHIP

the consensus document

 Active analysis of Tor traffic, blocking Tor connections



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
USABILITY

Peeling the Onion's User Experience Layer: Examining Naturalistic Use of the Tor Browser

Kevin Gallagher New York University kevin.gallagher@nyu.edu Sameer Patil
Indiana University Bloomington
patil@indiana.edu

Brendan Dolan-Gavitt New York University brendandg@nyu.edu

- 50% of all participants report some type of functional hindrance
- Biggest issues were latency and functionality breaks
- Users also reported lack of trust due to unrefined UX of the browser



An Onion Proxy needs to be set up to route traffic through Tor:

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
CENSORSHIP

An Analysis of Tor Pluggable Transports Under Adversarial Conditions


Khalid Shahbar A. Nur Zincir-Heywood
Faculty of Computer Science
Dalhousie University
Halifax, Canada
{Shahbar, Zincir}@cs.dal.ca

- Tor traffic is identifiable by censors due to certain unique characteristics
- Methods to hide Tor traffic are ineffective
- Tor traffic can be identified with an accuracy of > 90% even if it is made to look like any other protocol's traffic

65




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Tor Circuit setup

- Requires extra steps and hence extra time before a connection to the internet can be established




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Tor Circuit setup

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Traffic routing through Tor relays

- User's traffic is routed through at least 3 Tor relays before it reaches the end server adding extra latency
- The Tor relays are volunteer owned and operated network resources and are hence limited in number



- Setting up a Tor Circuit
- Network traffic is routed through a minimum of three Onion routers which are volunteered owned and operated



NavigaTor: Finding Faster Paths to Anonymity

Robert Annessi*
Institute of Telecommunications, TU Wien
Gusshausstr. 25/E389, 1040 Vienna, Austria
robert.annessi@nt.tuwien.ac.at
*Corresponding author

Martin Schmiedecker SBA Research Favoritenstraße 16, 1040 Vienna, Austria mschmiedecker@sba-research.org


- Tor is slower than regular traffic due to the very nature of the network itself
- Evaluating circuit build times and congestion awareness can reduce the latency experienced by a user
- There is a tradeoff between anonymity and latency


The number of web resources on the regular internet that a Tor user can access



 The end server (Mahnaz) sees the traffic coming from the Exit Relay instead of the sender (Daniyal) The number of web resources on the regular internet that a Tor user can access

Fate Sharing






Tor users

Tor relays


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
Tor relays
























































































can access **Differential Treatment Fate Sharing** Roya Threat Info **Taimoor** Threat Info Threat Mahnaz Intelligence Threat Info **Daniyal**

Characterizing the Nature and Dynamics of Tor Exit Blocking


Rachee Singh¹, Rishab Nithyanand², Sadia Afroz^{3,4} Paul Pearce³, Michael Carl Tschantz⁴, Phillipa Gill¹, Vern Paxson^{3,4}


Characterizing the Nature and Dynamics of Tor Exit Blocking

Rachee Singh¹, Rishab Nithyanand², Sadia Afroz^{3,4} Paul Pearce³, Michael Carl Tschantz⁴, Phillipa Gill¹, Vern Paxson^{3,4}

Key goals

- Analyzing the extent of server-side discrimination faced by Tor users
- Analyzing the undesired traffic sent through Tor relays
- Analyzing whether the Tor network is blocked "reactively" or "proactively"







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
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- The crawler visited the Alexa top 500 websites
 - Collected HAR files
 - Recorded screenshots of all pages visited




CAPTCHAs





CAPTCHAs




Block pages









Alexa Top 500

Alexa Top 500

Front page

20%

Alexa Top 500


Front page


20%

Front page + Search (S-243)

17.4%


3.9%








Of all Tor users face some form of differential treatment on the regular internet








Of all Tor users face some form of differential treatment on the regular internet



Analyzing the undesired traffic sent through Tor relays **Collection**







- Abuse E-mails from 25 Tor relays
 - 10 relays run by themselves
 - 15 relays run by other individuals


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- 3 million emails
 - Collected over a period of ~6 years
 - Clustering to find similar complaints

Results

- Abuse E-mails from 25 Tor relays
 - 10 relays run by themselves
 - 15 relays run by other individuals

- 3 million emails
 - Collected over a period of ~6 years
 - K-means clustering to find similar complaints



Exit Family	# Exits	% Tor Traffic	Email Dates	# Complaints	Top Complaint
Torservers.net	10-20	7.05%	2010/06-2016/04	2,987,017	DMCA Violation (99.74%)
apx	3	1.94%	2014/11-2016/05	293	Automated Scan (38.49%)
TorLand1	1	0.75%	2011/12-2016/10	307	Malicious Traffic (16.99%)
jahjah	1	0.17%	2016/1-2017/1	75	Unauthorized Login Attempts (34.15%)
Our exits	10	3.14%	2016/9-2017/2	650	Network Attack (48.68%)


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
- Reactive Blocking
 - "Response to abuse"
 - If less than 30% of all Tor relays were listed within 24 hours


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


Reactive Blocking

"Response to abuse"







Putting it all together

- Individuals wanting to use the Tor network can not access it due to usability and censorship issues

- Users able to access the Tor network face issues of latency due to the very nature of the network itself

- Tor users are discriminated against by end servers
- These problems lead to the degradation of the utility of the Tor network

Future work


- Working on identifying users who send in malicious traffic without deanonymizing them

- Incentivizing more volunteers to set up Onion routers

- Spreading awareness about Tor enhancing the reputation of the network

THANK YOU!

THE Tor NETWORK









Research Question:

The number of people who can actually access the Tor network over the number of people trying to access the Tor network

Problems

- Censorship
- Usability of the Tor Browser/Proxy



Research Question:

The number of web resources that an individual using the Tor network can access as compared to an individual using a regular browser

Problems

- Server side blocking